We show how a stochastic variation of a Ramsey's theorem can be used to prove the existence of the value, and to construct -optimal strategies, in two-player zero-sum dynamic games that have certain properties.
Introduction
Competitive interaction between two players is quite common, and it is desirable to know whether such interaction has a value. That is, whether there is some quantity such that for every ¿ 0 the maximizing player can guarantee receiving, on average, at least this quantity (up to ), and the minimizing player can guarantee paying, on average, no more than this quantity (up to ). Once the value exists, ÿnding -optimal strategies for the two players (which guarantee that they receive at least the value, or pay no more than the value, up to ) is also desirable.
When the interaction lasts for a single stage, or for a bounded number of stages, existence of the value is usually proven using a ÿxed-point argument, and hinges on the continuity of the payo in the strategies of the players.
When the duration of the interaction is long but not known in advance, it is convenient to assume that the interaction lasts for countably many stages (see Aumann and Maschler, 1995, p. 143, and Sorin, 2001 , for justiÿcation). However, in this formulation, the payo is often not continuous in the strategies of the players, and therefore one cannot use standard ÿxed-point theorems to prove the existence of the value. Various techniques have been employed in the literature to handle this problem (see, e.g., Mertens and Neyman, 1981; Sudderth, 1993, 1998; Nowak, 1985) , but it seems that each technique can be applied to only some models, under special conditions, or else is not constructive.
Here we present another tool for proving the existence of the value in inÿnite-stage competitive interactions, or two-player zero-sum dynamic games. We show how a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem 2 can be used to reduce the analysis of the inÿnite-stage interaction to the analysis of ÿnite-stage interactions.
To exhibit the new technique, we apply it to the following generalization of stopping games (see Dynkin, 1969) . At the outset of the game, the state of the world is chosen according to some known probability distribution, but is not revealed to the players. At every stage of the game, the players gain some information about the state of the world; both receive the same information. Then each player chooses an action. The pair of actions, together with the state of the world, determines a probability of termination, and a terminal payo if the game terminates at that stage. If the game never terminates, the payo to both players is 0.
The goal of the maximizing player is to maximize the expected payo , and the goal of the minimizing player is to minimize this quantity.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we formally present the model and the main result, stating that in our model the value exists. In Section 3 we state the stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem that we use, and we apply it to our model to exhibit the new technique. Further discussion appears in Section 4.
The model and the main result
We consider inÿnite-stage dynamic games in discrete time that are given by:
• A probability space ( ; F; P) that captures the uncertainty of the state of the world.
We denote by E the expectation w.r.t. P.
• A ÿltration (F n ) n∈N that describes the information available to both players at stage n.
• Two measurable spaces (A; A) and (B; B) of actions for the two players.
• For each n ∈ N, F n ⊗ A ⊗ B-measurable functions p n : × A × B → [0; 1] and g n : × A × B → [−1; 1]; p n indicates the probability of termination, while g n indicates the terminal payo .
The game is played as follows. At the outset, a state of the world ! ∈ is chosen according to the probability measure P. At every stage n, the players independently and simultaneously choose actions a n ∈ A and b n ∈ B. These choices must be measurable with regard to their information, namely, F n and previously played actions. The game terminates with probability p n (!; a n ; b n ), and the terminal payo is g n (!; a n ; b n ). The game continues to stage n + 1 with probability 1 − p n (!; a n ; b n ).
Our model is a generalization of stopping games (see, e.g., Dynkin, 1969; Rosenberg et al., 2001 or Touzi and Vieille, 2002) . It is also closely related to general stochastic games (see, e.g., Nowak, 1985 or Maitra and Sudderth, 1998) .
For every measurable space M , we denote by P(M ) the space of probability distributions over M .
The space of inÿnite plays is (A × B) N × . We equip it with the product -algebra (A ⊗ B) N ⊗ F. We denote by G n = (A × B) n−1 ⊗ F n the -algebra that represents the information available to the players at stage n. It is convenient to consider F n as a sub--algebra of G n .
A strategy = ( n ) n∈N of player 1 is a collection of functions such that n :
Strategies of player 2 are deÿned analogously.
Every pair ( ; ) of strategies, together with P, naturally deÿnes a probability distribution over (A × B) N × . The corresponding expectation operator is denoted by E ; .
Denote by Â the stage of termination, so that Â = +∞ if termination never occurs. The distribution of Â is formally given by P(Â = 1)(!; a; b) = p 1 (!; a; b); P(Â 6 k)(!; a 1 ; b 1 ; : : : ; a k ; b k ) = P(Â 6 k − 1)(!; a 1 ; b 1 ; : : : ; a k−1 ; b k−1 )
For every pair ( ; ) of strategies, the expected payo is
where 1 is the indicator function.
The goal of player 1 is to maximize the expected payo , while the goal of player 2 is to minimize this quantity. 
holds, then the common value is the value of the game. Given ¿ 0, every strategy of player 1 that attains the supremum on the left-hand side of (1) up to is -optimal for player 1. Every strategy of player 2 that attains the inÿmum on the right-hand side of (1) up to is -optimal for player 2.
Our main result is the following Theorem 1. If A, B are compact metric spaces, and the functions g n (!; ·; ·) and p n (!; ·; ·) are continuous for each ! ∈ and every n ∈ N, the game has a value.
Our main contribution is not in the technical result, but in the new technique that we use for the proof.
We now brie y compare our result to the existing literature. Under some regularity assumptions on ( ; F; P), the model we consider is a class of general stochastic games. Sudderth (1993, 1998) proved the existence of the value in a fairly general setup of stochastic games. Maitra and Sudderth (1993) , using the operator approach and transÿnite induction, proved that certain measurable stochastic games admit a value, and both players have universally measurable -optimal strategies, for every ¿ 0. Relative to this result, our contribution is that we give a constructive argument for the existence of -optimal strategies, which are also uniformly -optimal in the sense deÿned below (see Section 4). Maitra and Sudderth (1998) , using the fact that every Borel game is solvable, proved that ÿnitely additive stochastic games admit a value, and both players have ÿnitely-additive -optimal strategies for every ¿ 0 (see also Martin, 1998) . Thus, relative to this result, our contribution is that both players have -additive uniformly -optimal strategies for every ¿ 0, rather than ÿnitely additive -optimal strategies. Rosenberg et al. (2001) , using the technique of vanishing discount factors, proved that when A and B are ÿnite, the value exists.
3. The proof 3.1. A stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem Ramsey (1930) proved that for every function c that attaches an element c(k; l) ∈ C, where C is a ÿnite set, to every two non-negative integers k ¡ l there is an increasing sequence of integers
We are going to attach an F n -measurable function c n; , whose range is some ÿnite set C, to every non-negative integer n and every stopping time . We also impose a consistency requirement: if 1 = 2 on an F n -measurable set F, then c n; 1 = c n; 2 on F. Under these conditions, a weaker conclusion than that of Ramsey's theorem can be derived: for every ¿ 0 there exists an increasing sequence of stopping times
Let ( ; F; P) be a probability space, and let (F n ) be a ÿltration. A stopping time (to the ÿltration (F n ) n∈N ) is a function :
→ N such that the set { = n} is F n -measurable for every n ∈ N. For every A; B ∈ F, A holds on B if and only if
Deÿnition 2. An NT-function is a function that assigns to every integer n ¿ 0 and every bounded stopping time an F n -measurable r.v. that is deÿned over the set { ¿ n}. We say that an NT-function f is C-valued, for some set C, if the r.v. f n; is C-valued, for every n ¿ 0 and every bounded stopping time .
Deÿnition 3. An NT-function f is consistent if for every n ¿ 0, every F n -measurable set F, and every two bounded stopping times 1 ; 2 , we have 1 = 2 ¿ n on F implies f n; 1 = f n; 2 on F:
When f is an NT-function, and 1 ¡ 2 are two bounded stopping times, we denote f 1 ; 2 (!) = f 1 (!); 2 (!). Thus f 1 ; 2 is an F 1 -measurable r.v.
The following theorem was proved by Shmaya and Solan (2002, Theorem 4.3) .
Theorem 2. For every ÿnite set C, every C-valued consistent NT-function f, and every ¿ 0, there exists a sequence of bounded stopping times 1 6 1 ¡ 2 ¡ 3 ¡ · · · such that
Application to games
Let = ( ; F; P; A; B; (p n ; g n )) be a dynamic game. For every two bounded stopping times 1 ¡ 2 , and every F 2 -measurable function h, let ( 1 ; 2 ; h) be the two-player zero-sum game that starts at stage 1 and, if not terminated earlier, terminates at stage 2 with terminal payo h. We do not introduce a new concept of a strategy in ( 1 ; 2 ; h). Rather, we take the strategy space in ( 1 ; 2 ; h) to coincide with that of , and we use conditional expectation on the event {Â ¿ 1 }.
The following standard lemma states that ( 1 ; 2 ; h) admits a value (see, e.g., Nowak, 1985, Theorem 5.2) . It follows using backward induction from Sion's (1958) minimax theorem and a measurable selection theorem (e.g., Kuratowski and Ryll-Nardzewski, 1965) . Lemma 1. Let 1 ¡ 2 be bounded stopping times, and h an F 2 -measurable function such that h ∞ 6 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, there exists an F 1 -measurable function v( ( 1 ; 2 ; h)), and a pair ( * ; * ) of strategies such that for every pair ( ; ) of strategies,
Actually, there are optimal strategies * = ( * n ) and * = ( * n ) such that * n and * n are F n -measurable, rather than G n -measurable (that is, the actions chosen at each stage n do not depend on previously chosen actions). Moreover, one can verify that (2) still holds if we replace * in Lemma 1 by any strategy such that, for every n ∈ N, n = * n on { 1 6 n ¡ 2 }. The following lemma summarizes simple monotonicity and continuity properties of the value operator.
and the sequence (h n ) converges pointwise to h on F, then
Set C = {'+'; '−'}, and deÿne a C-valued NT-function c as follows. For every n ∈ N and every stopping time , c(n; ) = '+' if v( (n; ; 0)) ¿ 0;
'−' if v( (n; ; 0)) 6 0:
Lemma 2(c) implies that c is a consistent NT-function. Finally, ÿx, once and for all ¿ 0. By Theorem 2 there exists an increasing sequence ( k ) of stopping times such that
An auxiliary game
For every k ∈ N deÿne E + k = {c( 1 ; 2 ) = '+' and c( k ; k+1 ) = '−'} and E − k = {c( 1 ; 2 ) = '−' and c( k ; k+1 ) = '+'}:
We now deÿne an auxiliary game , which is similar to , except that it has a di erent payo function (g n ) n∈N , that is deÿned as follows:
Thus, whenever c( k ; k+1 ) = c( 1 ; 2 ), we set the payo to be 0 from stage k and onwards.
Denote by ( ; ) the expected payo under the pair of strategies ( ; ) in . Since P(g n = g n for some n ∈ N) 6 P k∈N (E + k ∪ E − k ) ¡ , and since payo s are bounded by 1, for every pair of strategies ( ; ) one has | ( ; ) − ( ; )| ¡ .
Su ciency of the analysis of the auxiliary game
The following lemma asserts that if for every ¿ 0 there are 3 -optimal strategies in , then the original game admits a value.
Lemma 3. If for every ¿ 0 there exist V ∈ [−1; 1] and a pair ( ; ) of strategies that satisfy inf ( ; ) ¿ V − 3 and sup ( ; ) 6 V + 3 , then V := lim →0 V exists, and is the value of .
Observe that we do not require that V is the value of , or, for that matter, that the games ( ) ¿ 0 have values.
Proof. Let V be any accumulation point of the sequence (V ) ¿0 as goes to 0. Since | ( ; ) − ( ; )| ¡ , the assumptions imply that inf ( ; ) ¿ V − 4 and sup ( ; ) 6 V + 4 .
Therefore, for every there is ¿ 0 su ciently small such that inf ( ; ) ¿ V − 4 ¿ V − and sup ( ; ) 6 V + 4 6 V + . In particular, V is the value of .
Thus, our goal is to ÿnd V ∈ [−1; 1] and to construct a pair ( ; ) of strategies such that inf ( ; ) ¿ V − 3 and sup ( ; ) 6 V + 3 . In Section 3.5 we deÿne V , in Section 3.6 we deÿne , and in Section 3.7 we prove that inf ( ; ) ¿ V − 3 . The construction of , and the proof that sup ( ; ) 6 V + 3 , is analogous to that of , and hence omitted.
Properties of the coloring
By construction of , if v( ( 1 ; 2 ; 0)) ¿ 0 then v( ( k ; k+1 ; 0)) ¿ 0 for every k ∈ N, whereas if v( ( 1 ; 2 ; 0)) 6 0 then v( ( k ; k+1 ; 0)) 6 0 for every k ∈ N.
Let D + ={v( ( 1 ; 2 ; 0)) ¿ 0} ∈ F 1 , and
Similarly,
In particular, for every ÿxed k ∈ N, the sequence (v( ( k ; l ; 0))) l¿k is a sequence of F k -measurable functions, which is non-decreasing on D + and non-increasing on D − . Therefore, this sequence has a limit h * k , which is F k -measurable. Applying Lemma 2(b, d), we get
Set V = E[v( (1; 1 ; h
Deÿnition of a strategy
Choose l ∈ N su ciently large such that
For every k ∈ N choose an optimal strategy k for player 1 in the game ( k ; k+1 ; 0), and an optimal strategy * k in the game ( k ; k+1 ; h * k+1 ). Choose an optimal strategy 1;l for player 1 in the game ( 1 ; l ; 0), and, ÿnally, an optimal strategy 0 in the game (1; 1 ; h * 1 ). Recall that D + and D − are F 1 -measurable. Deÿne a strategy for player 1 as follows:
• follows 0 up to stage 1 .
• If ! ∈ D − , follows * k between stages k and k+1 , for every k ∈ N.
• If ! ∈ D + , follows 1;l between stages 1 and l . Then, for every k ¿ l, follows k between stages k and k+1 .
The strategy is 3 -optimal
Let be an arbitrary strategy of player 2. We prove that ( ; ) ¿ V − 3 . For convenience, set r Â = g Â (a Â ; b Â ) if Â ¡ + ∞ and r Â = 0 if Â = +∞. This is the terminal payo in the game.
Since 1;l is optimal in ( 1 ; l ; 0),
Since for every k ∈ N, k is optimal in ( k ; k+1 ; 0),
Taking the conditional expectation w.r.t. G 1 , and summing over k ¿ l, gives us
From (6) and (7) we have
By taking the expectation and using (5), we obtain
Since for every k ∈ N, * k is optimal in ( k ; k+1 ; h * k+1 ), and by the recursive relation (4),
Then taking the conditional expectation w.r.t. G k−1 in (9), and adding it to (9) where k has been replaced by k − 1, we get
Continuing inductively one obtains for every
Since h * k 6 0 for every k on D − , it follows by taking the expectation that
: By the bounded convergence theorem, we deduce that
By (8) and (10),
Since 0 is optimal in the game (1; 1 ; h * 1 ),
By (11) and (12),
Further discussion
Here we discuss the assumptions that our proof hinges on, as well as further topics. Our argument relies on the assumption that the evolution of the game is independent of the actions chosen by the players. That is, the players have no control over the information they receive during the game, but only over the probability of termination and the terminal payo . It is most desirable to extend our technique to the case where players do in uence their information.
Another aspect that we critically need is that the information be symmetric: both players should have the same information at every stage. If this is not the case, then the value need not exist (see Laraki, 2000 , for an example.) It is interesting to know under which informational structure the value still exists.
The strategy that we constructed in Section 3.6 is uniform in the following sense. There is N ¿ 0 such that for every n ¿ N
That is, the strategy is 5 + | V −V | -optimal in every ÿnite-stage interaction, provided the interaction is su ciently long.
The proof relies on the observation that if for some bounded stopping time , where ¿ k for k su ciently large, the expected payo under ( ; ) up to stage is significantly di erent from V , then the probability of termination between stages k and must be bounded away from 0. Therefore, such an event can occur only ÿnitely many times. Details are standard and omitted.
We assumed that the functions p n (!; ·; ·) and g n (!; ·; ·) are continuous for every ! ∈ . However, all we need is that for every F n+1 -measurable function f, the one-stage game (n; n + 1; f) with terminal payo f admits a value. More formally, we now present a more general version of the one-shot game. The proof of the following extension of Theorem 1 follows the same lines as the proof we presented.
Theorem 3. Let = ( ; F; P; (F n ); A; B; (g n ; p n )) be an inÿnite-stage dynamic game. Assume that for every n ∈ N and every F n -measurable function h : → [−1; 1], the one-shot game ( ; F n ; P; P(A); P(B); u) admits a value, where u(!; x; y) = A B p n (a; b)g n (a; b) + (1 − p n (a; b))h d x(a) dy(b). Then the game admits a value.
Theorem 2 can be applied to prove the existence of an equilibrium in two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time (see Shmaya and Solan, 2002) . However, whereas for non-zero-sum ÿnite-stage games a lot of structure is needed to ensure the existence of an equilibrium that satisÿes certain desirable properties, for zero-sum games the technique works in a much more general setup.
